Corruption and Accountability in Comparative Perspective

Coordenadores/Principal Investigator: 

Michigan State University


This research investigates the determinants of the performance of accountability institutions in new democracies. Current scholarship on accountability has identified a distinct mechanism through which the introduction of political competition may affect such institutions: the electoral connection or vertical accountability mechanism. This connection is not expected to be effective in new democracies because political competition is found to be volatile and non-programmatic. Another strand of the literature focuses on the effect of power alternation. Government turnover is expected to generate incentives for the creation/strengthening of autonomous institutions. By exploring a unique dataset on 33 state audit institutions, we bring together these distinct claims and provide systematic empirical tests for them. We find a negative effect of volatility on their institutional activism and a positive (direct and indirect) influence of power alternation on their levels of autonomy and on their sanctioning patterns.

Ano de Conclusão/Year of Conclusion: 
Ver as publicações desta pesquisa


Escolas FGV

Acompanhe na rede